Without a doubt, it was a tough year for Taiwan in 2024. Observing the geopolitical dynamics in 2024, I argue that although the multilateral relationships between the governments of Taiwan, the United States (US), Japan, and South Korea have remained close and solid over the past few years, recent changes in political leadership in the aforementioned countries in 2024 are expected to generate some levels of instability during the period of political transition. Coupled with some less-than-ideal decisions made by the Lai Administration to date, these factors all create great uncertainties for Taiwan moving into 2025.
A Path-Dependent Trajectory of Foreign Policy on China
Over the past few years, we have witnessed an increasingly shared consensus on the necessity to cope with China’s burgeoning assertive foreign policy amongst Taiwanese, US, Japanese, and South Korean governments. Although to different extents, one can argue that this shared consensus has created a path-dependent trajectory on the foreign policy orientation of these governments in this process.
As Leithner and Libby have summarised, path dependency denotes a process of producing and reproducing policy legacies. In application, the phenomenon can be observed when a set of foreign policies exhibits great stability and continuation over extended periods. For instance, in the case of the US, the first Trump administration (2017-2021) has shown an increased willingness to utilise trade policies in response to China’s cheap exporting of goods to the American market (e.g. raising tariffs on solar panels). Subsequently, maintaining a tougher stance towards China had largely been adopted by the Biden administration, whilst he also furthered the US government’s coordinating role in grouping its allies in forming an Indo-Pacific Allianceagainst China.
On the flip side, Taiwan has benefited immensely from this foreign policy goal. For instance, over the 8 years under the Obama administration (2008-2017), the total arms sales to Taiwan was approximately US$20 billion dollars (i.e. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) US$ 14 billion dollars, Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) US$ 6.2 billion dollars). However, a press release issued by the US-Taiwan Business Council in September 2024 identified that the total FMS to Taiwan alone during the 4-year Trump administration was at US$18.278 billion dollars. Although the Biden administration’s FMS to Taiwan only accounted for US$ 5.709 billion dollars, the approval of various bills, such as the 2022 Menedez’s Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act, demonstrate a closer bilateral relationship between Taiwan and the US government and the latter’s continuous support for enhancing Taiwan’s self-defence capacities in the face of China’s aggression.
In the case of Japan, it is important to point out that when Trump took office as US President in 2017, the late Abe Shinzo was serving as the Prime Minister of Japan. Prime Minister Abe had always been cautious towards China’s expansionist foreign policy. Notable examples of Abe’s foreign policies include shifting his emphasis from the Asia-Pacific region to the Indo-Pacific region by reaching out and underscoring the importance of India. Furthermore, in order to counteract China’s entrenched involvement in the Southeast Asia region, Abe launched the 2018 New Tokyo Strategy of Mekong-Japan Cooperation as another alternative for regional countries.
Succeeding Abe, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio had largely maintained his predecessor’s foreign policy stance in support of a closer US-Japan alliance and arm’s-length relationship with China. To a certain extent, one can argue that Kishida has adopted a far more active foreign policy position to demonstrate Japan’s support for the US via active engagements in security initiatives such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue alongside the US, Australia and India, as well as the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).
Similarly, South Korea’s President Yoon Suk-yeol had already adopted a harder line on China during his presidential campaign. Moreover, after taking office in 2022, he has not only publicly railed against ‘attempts to change the status quo by force’ in the Taiwan Strait but also became the first South Korean president to attend the NATO summit in April 2023.
The close partnership between the US, Japan, and South Korea is exemplified in the historic trilateral summit of the three leaders held at Camp David in August 2023. These developments have provided a favourable path-dependent trajectory for Taiwan to counteract China’s aggressions for unification. Yet, these circumstances have altered in 2024.
Changes and Uncertainties
Possibly one of the few political developments in 2024 that remained somewhat steadfast is Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) managed to secure another 4-year term of the presidency. Hence, one should expect a continuation of the DPP government’s cross-strait policies in Lai’s first tenure as president. Nevertheless, Taiwan is not the only country that has witnessed a change in political leadership. In fact, almost all of Taiwan’s political allies are experiencing various levels of political transitions.
Japan and South Korea
Many were caught off guard when Prime Minister Kishida announced his decision not to run for re-election in August 2024, which indicates he would be leaving his position as Premier. Many reasons contributed to Kishida’s decision, but the main factor is directed to his declining approval rate below 30% due to a political fundraising scandal that involved the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Although we are unlikely to see any drastic shift in Japan’s foreign policy on China under Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru, whether Taiwan gains a firm supporter that would support the country in times of China’s aggression is hinged on Ishiba’s ability to consolidate his support with a minority government.
Given the recent resignation of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol due to his ill decision to impose martial law, it is too early to assess the effects it may have on Taiwan. This, however, adds to the aspect of uncertainty.
The Return of Trump and Taiwan
President Lai may have played his cards too safe when it comes to making an impression on President Donald Trump. The recently concluded US Presidential election would bring President Trump back to the White House for another 4-year tenure of presidency. Given that the US Presidential election is held every four years, this should provide the incumbent administration sufficient time to articulate and rehearse different ways to respond to the outcome. For instance, in the case of former President Tsai, the phone call conversation between Tsai and President Trump was a bold gamble for both sides when the latter was elected in 2016. Certainly, that phone call was a gamble and was an abnormality that broke the US policy stance set since 1979. Yet, it worked in favour of Tsai as it set the tone for a closer partnership with President Trump from the get-go. Again in 2020, Tsai was also amongst the first few leaders to congratulate President Biden on his successful election in 2020. These gestures are important insofar as they demonstrate an early sign of how governments are approaching their bilateral relations.
Nevertheless, in 2024, President Lai merely sent his congratulatory letter to President Trumpvia the representative office in Washington, which seemed too reserved and unsatisfactory. As noted by former DPP legislator Lo Chih-Cheng, President Lai was one of the latest heads of government in Asia to congratulate Trump’s victory.
To make things worse, President Lai’s decision to invite Han Kuo-Yu, now Speaker of the Legislative Yuan, to lead Taiwan’s delegation to Trump’s inauguration may be too much of a gamble. In fact, it has been reported that the KMT representative to the US, Chin Jih-Hsin, has been extending domestic political disputes to America by driving a wedge between the ruling DPP government and US officials.
Although one can argue that the US government’s recent approval of a total worth of US$ 295 million in arms sales to Taiwan demonstrates a solid Taiwan-US relationship, this can only be regarded, at best, as a parting gift of President Biden before the end of his presidency. Unfortunately, Taiwan seems to be entering a phase of uncertainty in the aspect of geopolitics moving into 2025.
Conclusions
In this short article, I began by analysing the path-dependent trajectory that shaped how the US, Japanese, and South Korean governments approach China. Referencing aspects such as the US government’s total arms sales to Taiwan over the past few years, as well as the public statements and policy initiatives put forward by the Japanese and South Korean leaders, it is evident that their foreign policy on China exhibits attributes of stability and continuity. It was pointed out that this has created a favourable external political environment for Taiwan to cope with China’s aggression.
In turn, I identified my concerns with the drastic changes in political leadership in the US, Japan, and South Korea in 2024. Finally, I argued that President Lai’s congratulatory letter to President Trump may not have made any significant impression on him, given it was too late and too reserved. Moreover, his decision to appoint Speaker Han as the leader of the Taiwan delegation to Trump’s inauguration may also be unwise and too risky. Those mentioned above all contribute to the geopolitical uncertainties Taiwan will be facing in 2025.
This article is also published on Taiwan Insight